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ART CRIMES?: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR ILLEGALLYCREATED GRAFFITI ART
Jamison Davies*
ABSTRACT
This paper begins by examining whether illegally-created graffiti art is entitled
to copyright protection under the current copyright law. Analogies are made to
other forms of unwanted expression, fraud and obscenity, and their historical and
current copyright status. The remainder of the paper uses graffiti art as a lens
through which to examine various theoretical explanations of copyright, both as
descriptive theories of production and as normative theories of protection.
I. INTRODUCTION
“It’s an insidious thing, this graffiti, and we don’t intend to
let it get away from us.”
1

- Michael A. Lombardi, Metropolitan Transit Authority, 1991

In July 2006, the University Press of Mississippi published a book containing
photographs of graffiti murals taken by a New York periodontist, Peter
Rosenstein.2 In response, more than a dozen artists joined to seek damages from
Rosenstein for the alleged illegal use of their copyrighted works and to enjoin
publication of the book. The publisher withdrew the book within a month of its
release and the artists later settled with Rosenstein on undisclosed terms.3
Rosenstein argued that his photographs were a fair use because the murals were on
public display and because the photographs were for the purpose of illustrating art
criticism and reviews. The artists responded that his book was thinly researched,
contained a variety of inaccuracies and mischaracterizations of the artists’ works,4
and, for good measure, that Rosenstein had displayed photographic prints of the
works at a Chelsea art gallery.
At the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing, when the Spanish synchronized
swim team was not allowed to wear suits embedded with waterproof lights, they
decided instead to wear suits featuring a large cartoon character across the front

* Law clerk to the Hon. Edward R. Korman. J.D. Harvard Law School 2011; B.A. Boston
College 2008. Thanks go to Professor Julie Cohen for thoughtful commentary on early versions of this
paper and the editorial staff at the Maine Law Review for all their hard work. The opinions expressed
here represent my own and not those of my employer.
1. Stephanie Strom, Subway Graffiti Back and Bothersome, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1991, at B1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1991/02/11/nyregion/subway-graffiti-back-and-bothersome.html.
2. PETER ROSENSTEIN & ISABEL BAU MADDEN, TATTOOED WALLS (2006) (out of print).
3. David Gonzalez, Walls of Art for Everyone, but Made by Not Just Anyone, N.Y. TIMES, June 4,
2007, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/04/nyregion/04citywide.html.
4. His book, for instance, claimed to focus on “edgy” graffiti, but incorporated many murals done
with the permission of the property owner and in close collaboration with local residents. Id.
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and back.5 German graffiti artist Cantwo alleged that the character was a copy of
one he had spraypainted (legally) in 2001.6 No one sought his permission, and it is
unclear how the work even ended up on the team’s swimsuits. When interviewed
on the subject, Cantwo pointed out that copyright issues plague graffiti artists:
“people think that because our work is public and it is sometimes illegally painted,
they could [sic] use it any way they want.”7
Though these two cases can be resolved fairly easily, as the infringed artwork
was created legally, the question of whether or not illegally created graffiti is
entitled to copyright protection remains open. Though nothing in the Copyright
Act itself8 denies protection to any class of works based on the legality of the
work’s origin, the one court to have considered this issue has indicated that
illegally-created graffiti art may not be entitled to copyright protection. In Villa v.
Pearson Education, Inc.,9 Hiram Villa sued Brady Publishing for publishing,
without permission, a piece he painted in its strategy guide for one of the Tony
Hawk videogames. The defendant asserted that the complaint should be dismissed
because “the mural in question is not protected by copyright, either because it is
illegal graffiti or because it incorporates words or letters.”10 The court denied the
defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that “[b]oth of [defendant’s] . . . arguments
turn on questions of fact . . . .”11 The court found that the claim that the work was
not copyrightable due to its illicit origin “would require a determination of the . . .
circumstances under which the mural was created.”12 This seems implicitly to
suggest that if the defendant could prove that the work was created illegally then
the plaintiff’s copyright would be invalid, and one commentator has read the case
this way.13
In addition, there is a strong normative intuition that a work made in violation
of the law should not be entitled to copyright protection.14 This seems to stem from
a moral judgment that people should not profit from their own wrongdoing, the

5. Markus Balser, Cantwo Says “Can Not!” to Spanish Swimmers, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Sep. 9,
2008, 4:44 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/09/09/cantwo-says-can-not-to-spanish-swimwear/
6. Id.
7. Id. Cantwo has declined, thus far, to pursue his claim against the Spanish Olympic team, citing
the need to “to find an [sic] Spanish lawyer first” and the fact that “the Spanish system works different
[sic] from the German system.” E-mail from Cantwo, German Graffiti Artist, to Author (Mar. 23, 2010,
16:27 EST) (on file with author).
8. 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2007 & Supp. 2011).
9. No. 03 C 3717, 2003 WL 22922178 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2003).
10. Id. at *2.
11. Id. at *3.
12. Id.
13. Danwill Schwender, Promotion of the Arts: An Argument for Limited Copyright Protection of
Illegal Graffiti, 55 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A 257, 268–69 (2007).
14. As an anecdotal example, see, e.g., Comments to Cantwo Says “Can Not!” to Spanish
Swimmers, supra note 5 (“[I]f some guy vandalizes public or private property with his graffiti, literally
creating these images on someone else’s wall against their will, how can he later claim copyright
protection?” . . . “[W]hat about that maxim . . . that no one should profit from his own wrongdoing[?]” .
. . “There should be no copyright attached as a public policy consideration favoring the elimination of
graffiti.”).
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same intuition that undergirds the “unclean hands” doctrine,15 and “Son of Sam”
laws.16 Instrumentally, providing copyright protection for works created illegally
could create an extrinsic incentive for individuals to engage in illegal behavior, or
weaken the disincentives created by the criminal law.17
This Article will examine various theoretical justifications that militate for or
against granting copyright to a work created in violation of the criminal law,
focusing in particular on graffiti art as a salient example. The next section will
outline the current state of the copyright doctrine as it relates to graffiti18 and
conclude that, if a court were to consider the question directly, illegally created
graffiti art probably would receive copyright protection. The third section will
consider the intellectual property protection of graffiti from a variety of theoretical
perspectives and argue that neither full copyright protection nor the denial of
copyright would effectively address the issues that are raised by graffiti art. The
fourth section will then consider what would be the best allocation of rights to
graffiti art if one were to design the system ex ante.
II. DOES ILLEGAL GRAFFITI ART HAVE COPYRIGHT PROTECTION?
A. The Current State of the Doctrine: Villa v. Pearson Education
As a threshold matter, graffiti satisfies all of the statutory requirements for
copyright protection.19 It is tangible, fixed (though often temporary due to
eradication efforts), and certainly satisfies the minimal originality requirement set
out by the Supreme Court in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service
Co.20 If we are to find an exception to the copyrightability of graffiti, it must lie
outside the Copyright Act itself.
15. The principle that “‘whenever a party who, as actor, seeks to set the judicial machinery in
motion and obtain some remedy, has violated conscience, or good faith, or other equitable principle, in
his prior conduct, then the doors of the court will be shut against him in limine; the court will refuse to
interfere on his behalf, to acknowledge his right, or to award him any remedy.’” Keystone Driller Co. v.
Gen. Excavator Co. 290 U.S. 240, 244–45 (1933) (quoting JOHN NORTON POMEROY, 1 EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 397 (4th ed. 1918)). Generally, however, “[m]isconduct . . . unrelated to the claim to
which it is asserted as a defense, does not constitute unclean hands.” A.H. Emery Co. v. Marcan Prods.
Corp., 389 F.2d 11, 18 (2d Cir. 1968) (quotations and citations omitted); contra Devils Films, Inc. v.
Nectar Video, 29 F. Supp.2d 174, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (invoking unclean hands in refusing to order
seizure of defendant’s infringing copies of plaintiff’s video tapes because plaintiff’s tapes were
obscene).
16. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 2005) (requiring “profits from crime” to be paid
to victims); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-7319 (2012) (requiring money gained from books, magazines, TV
appearances, etc. to be paid to victims).
17. See Note, Can Intellectual Property Law Regulate Behavior? A “Modest Proposal” for
Weakening “Unclean Hands,” 113 HARV. L. REV. 1503, 1515 (2000) (“[A] person anticipating the
receipt of a federal [copyright] privilege might actually be motivated to break various laws . . .”). This
is, of course, true but equally applicable to any federal benefit. For example, persons who anticipate
Medicare reimbursement might be motivated to defraud the Medicare system, but this tells us little
about the intrinsic desirability of Medicare.
18. To avoid repetition, unless otherwise mentioned, graffiti refers to graffiti created in violation of
one or more criminal laws.
19. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2007 & Supp. 2011) (defining “copies”).
20. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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Villa v. Pearson Education, Inc.21 is the only case that directly raises the point
of the copyrightability of graffiti. The Villa court indicated that graffiti may not be
eligible for copyright protection if it was created illegally.22 One commentator
reads Villa as establishing that “the current state of the law denies street graffiti
artists any protection from copyright infringement due to the defense of
illegality.”23 This overreads the court’s decision substantially. While the court did
write that the question of whether the work was copyrightable “require[d] a
determination of the . . . circumstances under which the mural was created,”24 the
court does not state explicitly that a finding of illegality would preclude copyright
protection, and engages in no substantive discussion of the issue. It is perfectly
possible that, were the issue properly before the court, it would conclude that the
illegality of the work did not affect its copyrightability. Since the plaintiff needed
only to survive a motion to dismiss, there was no reason for the court to engage the
issue of copyrightability. Even under the defendant’s theory of the law, the plaintiff
could win if he could show that the mural was legally created and the motion could
not be granted while construing all the facts in favor of the plaintiff. Absent
briefing on the issue and direct consideration of the relevant law, it is too much to
say that the court definitively held that illegally created graffiti was not entitled to
copyright protection.
B. Analogous Domains: Copyright in Obscene and Fraudulent Works
Though only one decision directly addresses the issue of whether illegally
created graffiti is copyrightable, there is a fairly extensive history of two analogous
domains where works’ copyrightability has been challenged due to violations of
other laws. Though we most often study obscenity in the context of the First
Amendment, there have been several cases discussing whether obscene works can
obtain copyright protection, even though they are otherwise properly the subject of
anti-obscenity laws. Similarly, the courts have weighed whether fraudulent
materials can gain the benefits of copyright, notwithstanding their illicit intent.
These two domains give us some indications of various courts’ thinking on how the
copyright law interacts with other domains and whether independent legal
obligations ought to weigh in our consideration of whether a work merits copyright
protection.
1. Obscenity
The federal courts’ treatment of copyright in two other realms, fraud and
obscenity, is instructive about the general copyrightability of works that are created
in violation of some other (non-copyright) law. Early cases found that works
which were “grossly indecent and calculated to corrupt the morals of the people”
were not copyrightable.25 As such works did not “promote the [p]rogress of

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

No. 03 C 3717, 2003 WL 22922178 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2003).
Id. at *3.
Schwender, supra note 13, at 257.
Villa, 2003 WL 22922178, at *3.
Martinetti v. Maguire, 16 F. Cas. 920, 922 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867).
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Science and useful Arts,”26 it was beyond the power of Congress to extend
copyright to them.27
Courts have since retreated from this position. The leading case on the
copyrightability of obscene materials, Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult
Theater,28 found that “[t]here is not even a hint in [17 U.S.C. § 4 (1970)] that the
obscene nature of a work renders it any less a copyrightable ‘writing.’”29 The court
found that the Copyright Act was purposefully chosen to be content-neutral with
“no stated limitations on taste or government acceptability.”30 In addition, because
the test for obscenity requires consideration of local community standards, and
copyright law is meant to be nationally uniform, an obscenity exception “would
create the dilemma of choosing between using community standards that would
(arguably unconstitutionally) fragment the uniform national standards of the
copyright system and venturing into the uncharted waters of a national obscenity
standard.”31 The Mitchell Bros. court also rejected a variety of equitable doctrines
to avoid enforcement of copyrights in obscene materials, including the unclean
hands doctrine.32
The Mitchell Bros. court further considered the deterrence argument for
denying protection for obscene materials.33 It recognized that the denial of
copyright protection would have two effects on the deterrence calculus for
producers of obscene materials. Denying protection would likely increase the
production of obscene material in the short run, as copyists would be free to copy
and distribute obscene works with impunity,34 at a price equal to their marginal
cost. In the long term, however, distributors of obscene materials would be
discouraged from producing obscene works if they were aware, ex ante, that courts
would refuse to protect their works from unauthorized reproduction. This
deterrence calculus is analogous to the graffiti context, as will be explored further
below.
Similarly, in Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy,35 the Ninth Circuit held that obscenity
was not a defense to a claim of copyright infringement. The court engaged in a
relatively sparse discussion of the law, relying mainly on the Fifth Circuit’s opinion
in Mitchell Bros. to find that obscenity was not a valid defense to copyright and
noting that “[t]he leading treatise on copyright has called the Fifth Circuit’s
Mitchell Brothers case ‘the most thoughtful and comprehensive analysis of the
26. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
27. Martinetti, 16 F. Cas. at 922; see also Edward S. Rogers, Copyright and Morals, 18 MICH. L.
REV. 390 (1920) (arguing that extending copyright to obscene materials would be unconstitutional);
Franklin J. Wallahan, Comment, Immorality, Obscenity and the Law of Copyright, 6 S.D. L. REV. 109,
109–16 (1961) (tracing the doctrine of denying copyright based on obscenity).
28. 604 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979); see also Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir.
1982).
29. Mitchell Bros. Film Grp. v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d at 854.
30. Id. at 856.
31. Id. at 858.
32. Id. at 861–63.
33. Id. at 862–63.
34. Id. Copyists would possess impunity from copyright infringement liability, at least. The threat
of criminal sanction remains.
35. 666 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1982).
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issue.”36 The court went on to a brief discussion of the fragmentation argument,
noting that because obscenity is a community standard which varies from place to
place, “[a]cceptance of an obscenity defense would fragment copyright
enforcement, protecting registered materials in a certain community, while, in
effect, authorizing pirating in another locale.37
The view that obscenity is not a defense to copyright violations is not
uniformly held among the federal courts, however. In Devils Films, Inc. v. Nectar
Video,38 the court found that, while it did not need to decide whether “obscenity is a
defense to a claim of copyright violation[,]”39 it was “far from clear that the Second
Circuit will follow the Fifth and Ninth Circuits in rejecting the argument that
obscene material is entitled to copyright protection.”40 The plaintiff in that case
was asking the court to order the impoundment of the defendant’s pornographic
materials which allegedly were copies of the plaintiff’s films. The court found that
once a work had been deemed by the courts to be obscene, there was no reason to
“expend its resources on behalf of a plaintiff who it could as readily be tried for a
violation of the federal criminal law.”41 Though the situation in this case was
somewhat unique, as the court was asked to exercise its equitable powers on behalf
of the producer of concededly obscene works, it suggests that there remains a
strong distaste for enforcing copyright protections for producers of obscenity and a
willingness to extend the “unclean hands” doctrine beyond its traditional limits to
cover “‘[m]isconduct . . . unrelated to the claim to which it is asserted as a defense .
. . .’”42 Indeed, the court’s distaste was so strong that it later refused to sign a
proposed consent final judgment and permanent injunction, stating that it would not
“aid and abet the plaintiff’s pornography business by implicitly agreeing to use its
contempt powers to punish the defendant from copying the plaintiff’s
pornography.”43 Also, it again invoked the unclean hands doctrine as a justification
for its refusal to aid the plaintiff.44
36. Id. at 406 (quoting NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 2.17, 2-194.2 (1980).
37. Id.
38. 29 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
39. Id. at 176.
40. Id.
41. Id. The court also rejected the argument that it lacked discretion to deny equitable relief under
the Copyright Act. Id. (citing Midway Mfg. v. Omni Video Games, 668 F.2d 70, 72 (1st Cir. 1981);
Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Jane Doe, 821 F. Supp. 82, 85 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)).
42. A.H. Emery Co. v. Marcan Prods. Corp., 389 F.2d 11, 18 (2d Cir.1968) (quotations and citations
omitted).
43. Devils Films, Inc. v. Nectar Video, No. 98 CIV 8016 JSM, 2000 WL 1201383, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 23, 2000). Indeed, the court’s distaste is palpable. It could not bring itself even to refer one of the
categories of the plaintiff’s films, referring to it only as “one even more explicit category” and wrote
that “[i]t strains credulity that Congress intended to extend the protection of the copyright law to
contraband.” Devils Films, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 175–76.
44. Devils Films, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 175. It should be noted that this is a novel application of the
unclean hands doctrine, which traditionally extended only to misconduct related to the claim at bar, i.e.
if a copyright plaintiff was suing to enjoin infringement of a work it did not actually own and was itself
infringing. See, e.g., BRUCE P. KELLER & JEFFREY P. CUNARD, Copyright Law: A Practitioner’s Guide
§ 11.7.5.E (2012) (“The equitable defense of unclean hands may also be asserted against a copyright
owner, but only when the owner’s acts rise to the level of ‘blatant willful fraud’ or unconscionable
conduct that relates to the subject matter of the copyright litigation.”) (emphasis added); see also Dream
Games of Ariz., Inc. v. PC Onsite, 561 F.3d 983, 990–91 (9th Cir. 2009) (“the defense of illegality or
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A later decision from the District Court for the Southern District of New York
came to a somewhat different conclusion. In Nova Products, Inc. v. Kisma Video,
Inc.,45 the court found that the question of whether a work was obscene was
“inherently a fact-sensitive inquiry that is highly dependent upon both the
individual work and the governing community standards.”46 Thus, the court found
that it could not resolve the issue on summary judgment. More importantly, the
court discussed Mitchell Bros. and Jartech and found that there was “no reason to
depart from these thoughtful opinions” and hold that obscenity was a bar to
copyright protection.47 The court distinguished Devils Films mainly on the basis
that it was a denial of preliminary relief only, but, in the main, disagreed with the
Devils Films court and indicated that the Fifth and Ninth Circuits’ holdings that
obscenity was not a defense to copyright infringement should be followed.48
Litigants are still challenging the copyrightability of obscene works, and given
that there are only two leading cases on the issue, it is far from settled. Especially
with the proliferation of infringement suits premised on defendants’ peer-to-peer or
BitTorrent sharing of pornographic materials, the issue will continue to crop up.
For example, in a case challenging the subpoena of an Internet Service Provider for
information to identify an alleged downloader of a pornographic film, Judge Young
for the District Court of the District of Massachusetts noted that “it is a matter of
first impression in the First Circuit, and indeed is unsettled in many circuits,
whether pornography is in fact entitled to protection against copyright
infringement.”49 Though the court concluded that the issue was “not presently
before the Court and the Court expresses no opinion on it here,”50 it is notable that
the court decided to raise it of its own accord and engage in a brief discussion of
the relevant case law.
In another file-sharing case, the plaintiff sought a declaration that obscenity is
not copyrightable by arguing that obscenity cannot constitutionally receive
copyright protection and that the Ninth Circuit’s holding to the contrary in Jartech
is invalid because it effectively overruled a previous panel decision in the same
circuit without convening en banc.51 Indeed, in Martinetti v. Maguire,52 the former
unclean hands is ‘recognized only rarely, when the plaintiff’s transgression is of serious proportions and
relates directly to the subject matter of the infringement action. For instance, the defense has been
recognized when plaintiff misused the process of the courts by falsifying a court order or evidence, or by
misrepresenting the scope of his copyright to the court and opposing party.’” (quoting MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.09[B] (Mathew Bender, rev. ed. 2012)).
45. No. 02 Civ. 3850 (HB), 02 Civ. 6277 (HB), 03 Civ. 3379 (HB), 2004 WL 2754685 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 1, 2004).
46. Id. at *2.
47. Id. at *3.
48. See id. (“In short, even if the videos were ultimately proven to be obscene, following the Fifth
and Ninth Circuits’ holdings, this would not be a defense to copyright infringement.”).
49. Liberty Media Holdings, LLC v. Swarm Sharing Hash File AE340D0560129AFEE8D78CE
07F2394C7 B5BC9C05, 821 F. Supp. 2d 444, 447 n.2 (D. Mass. 2011).
50. Id.
51. See Plaintiff’s Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 9-10, Wong v. Hard Drive Prods., Inc.,
No. 12 CV 0469 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2012) (citing Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1171 (9th Cir.
2001), for the proposition that only an en banc court can overrule a prior panel decision in the same
circuit). The case ultimately settled after the defendant’s motion to dismiss was denied, though the
parties did not argue the copyrightability of obscenity in their motions. See generally Order Denying
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Circuit Court for the District of California ruled that obscene material was not
subject to copyright, and further, that Congress lacked the constitutional power to
extend copyright to that material.53 The Jartech court does not cite to Martinetti or
discuss why that precedent may not have been binding on it,54 so the issue is ripe
for additional discussion.
Though there was a period after Jartech and Mitchell Bros. where the
copyrightability of obscene works appeared to be settled, new cases suggest that
the issue is ripe for reevaluation. Inertia and precedent suggests that obscene and
pornographic works will continue to receive copyright protection, but given that
only two courts have discussed the matter in detail, there is plenty of room for
reconsideration and debate, and the cases are likely to continue to arise as copyright
owners combat diminutions in revenue due to widespread file-sharing over the
internet.
2. Fraud and Other Illegality
In the context of fraud, early courts found that there could be no copyright in
fraudulent materials.55 Early decisions accepted the argument that it was against
public policy to allow a plaintiff to profit from his fraud, and that the remedies of
copyright were thus unavailable under the unclean hands doctrine.56 The Ninth
Circuit, in Belcher v. Tarbox,57 found that reasoning to be unsound, arguing that
“[t]here is nothing in the Copyright Act to suggest that the courts are to pass upon
the truth or falsity, the soundness or unsoundness, of the views embodied in a
copyrighted work.”58 If the court did take the view that it was required to look into
the public injury caused by a fraudulent work, it found “[t]he gravity and
immensity of the problems, theological, philosophical, economic and scientific,
Motion to Dismiss, Wong v. Hard Drive Prods., Inc., No. 12 CV 0469 (N.D. Cal. April 13, 2012). The
defendant agreed to a stipulated that the plaintiff was not liable for any copyright infringement.
Stipulated Judgment at 1, Wong v. Hard Drive Prods., Inc., No. 12 CV 0469 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2012).
52. 16 F. Cas. 920, 922 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867).
53. Id. (holding that “a dramatic composition which is grossly indecent, and calculated to corrupt
the morals of the people . . . neither ‘promotes the progress of science or useful arts,’ but the contrary”
and thus was not subject to copyright). The court’s holding is indeed broad, because its consequence is
not just that Congress did not intend to extend copyright protection to obscene or indecent works, but
also that Congress could not do so within the bound of the Constitution. In a testament to evolving
community standards, the offending work contained scenes “‘of women lying about loose’- a sort of
Mohammedan paradise . . . with imitation grottos and unmaidenly houris,” and the court found the
plaintiff’s attempt to seek protection as a dramatic work “an insult to the genius of the English drama.”
Id.
54. See generally Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1982).
55. See, e.g., Stone & McCarrick v. Dugan Piano Co., 220 F. 837, 843 (5th Cir. 1915) (“[W]e have
reached the conclusion that the particular [fraudulent] advertising forms of the appellant, although
covered by the copyright of the manual of instruction, are (1) not copyrightable, and (2) they are not
entitled to the protection of a court of equity.”).
56. See Mitchell Bros. Film Grp. v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 864 (5th Cir. 1979)
(“Stone & McCarrick does not simply apply a traditional equitable doctrine; it goes further and extends
the doctrine of unclean hands to a situation not covered by the doctrine at common law and thus
subverts a statutory purpose.”).
57. 486 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1973).
58. Id. at 1088.
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that would confront a court . . . are staggering to contemplate.”59 The court also
noted that, if copyright protection were denied, there would be no restriction on the
reprinting of the fraudulent material and it could be distributed freely by anyone,60
thus leading to a net increase in the amount of fraudulent material.
The dissent, however, makes the other side of the deterrence argument:
“Persons who heretofore have never composed fraudulent literature can do so and
seek solace in the law as the protector of their copyrighted fraud.”61 In other
words, the ruling creates an additional incentive for fraudulent behavior. The
majority and the dissent thus take sharply contrasting views on the empirical
question of whether the ruling would lead to a net increase or decrease in the
amount of fraudulent works in existence, examining the incentives that run in both
directions. The dissent also makes the normative argument that federal copyright
protection is a privilege, and that the majority places the government’s “power,
endorsement and support behind fraudulent works.”62
Similarly, in Dream Games of Arizona, Inc. v. PC Onsite,63 the court held that
a work, in that case an electronic bingo game, did not lose copyright protection
when it was used in violation of state gaming laws.64 The fact that the work was
being used in violation of those laws did not affect the plaintiff’s right to traditional
copyright remedies, including statutory damages. The Dream Games court
reiterated the opinion that the Copyright Act does not demand, and common sense
precludes, a wide-ranging inquiry into the public harms that may result from
enforcing copyright protection on works that may violate other, unrelated, laws.
It is important not to overstate the analogy between copyright in obscene or
fraudulent materials, which have illicit content, and copyright in graffiti, which is
created by an illicit process.65 Still, the cases show a general evolution of courts’
attitudes toward copyright in materials that are in violation of a non-copyright
public policy. Over time, courts have shown an increased willingness to isolate the
copyrightability question from other public concerns, for both doctrinal and
prudential reasons. This indicates that, though the outcome is not by any means
certain, graffiti would likely receive copyright protection upon full consideration.
But should it?

59. Id.
60. See id. at 1088 n.3.
61. Id. at 1090 (Wallace, J., concurring and dissenting)
62. Id.
63. 561 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2009).
64. Id. at 991 (“[I]llegal operation of a copyrightable work neither deprives the work of copyright
protection nor precludes generally available remedies.”).
65. For the argument that courts should look to the process of a work’s creation to determine
whether it should be granted copyright, see Note, supra note 17; see also MELVILLE B. NIMMER &
DAVID NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.17 (Mathew Bender, rev. ed. 2012) (“[T]he currently
prevailing view” is that “no works are excluded from copyright by reason of their content.”) (emphasis
added).
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III. THEORIES OF PRODUCTION AND PROTECTION
A. Economic Theories
The standard economic account of why creators create is a theory of
incentives, both monetary66 and non-monetary.67 It assumes that authors require
incentives to create, and that the function of copyright law is to induce the optimal
level of creative activity.68 The standard analysis assumes that the production of
cultural works is a social good, and explains how copyright protection helps to
ensure that the market produces the optimal amount of creative expression by
giving the creator certain exclusive rights with respect to a work.69 There is a
wrinkle, however, in intellectual property as distinct from other forms of
production. Creative works are both an input and the output of their own
production functions. That is, “[c]reating a new work typically involves borrowing
or building on material from a prior body of works . . . .”70 Thus, a higher level of
copyright protection can, paradoxically, raise the cost of creating new works, lower
the total number of works created, and increase the price of creative works.71
Furthermore, recent scholarship discussing intellectual property’s “negative space”
has demonstrated that “exclusivity is only part of the incentive puzzle.”72
Assuming that authors require incentives to create, and that the public goods
nature of intellectual property would otherwise prevent them from recouping the
costs of their intellectual investments,73 authors require additional incentives to
produce. Intellectual property law and economics literature takes this essential
insight about incentives and focuses on developing it to determine what level of
copyright protection maximizes the total utility derived from the production of
cultural goods.74
The economic account of copyright protection, then, raises two questions for
the intersection of graffiti and copyright. The first is whether the traditional
incentive theory is a good fit for the actual production of graffiti, i.e. whether it
predicts the actual level of production that occurs. The second is what effect
different sets of intellectual property rights, and thus different incentive structures,
66. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J.
LEGAL STUD. 325, 328–29 (1989).
67. See id. at 331–32.
68. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 989, 994 (1997) (“[I]ndividuals will not invest in invention or creation unless the expected return
from doing so exceeds the cost of doing so--that is, unless they can reasonably expect to make a profit
from the endeavor.”); see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy
behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that [it] is the
best way to advance public welfare . . . .”).
69. Landes & Posner, supra note 66, at 341–43 (optimizing a mathematical model of idealized
copyright protection).
70. Id. at 332.
71. Id.
72. Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, A Theory of IP’s Negative Space, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 317, 321
(2011).
73. See Lemley, supra note 68, at 995–96 (explaining the nature of intellectual property as a public
good).
74. See id. at 997–1000 (discussing the dynamic optimization problem in intellectual property law).
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would have on the production of this class of works.
1. EXPLAINING INDIVIDUAL PRODUCTION
On the first question, the production of graffiti art seems to call into question
the necessity of legally-created incentives posited by standard economic models of
intellectual property production. Graffiti art has a good, but as yet untested, claim
to copyright protection.75 Even if graffiti had an unquestioned claim to copyright,
publicly-displayed illegal graffiti art is not easily commoditized.76 The art itself is,
of course, not salable. Derivative works, such as Dr. Rosenstein’s book of
photos,77 represent perhaps the best option for making money on graffiti, but the
market for such works is small, and illegal graffiti artists would have to compete in
that market with legal creators. There may also be a small licensing market for
publicly displayed art.78 In addition, the association of money often causes graffiti
artists to lose legitimacy in the eyes of their peers, imposing reputational costs that
may equal or outweigh potential monetary gains from distribution.79 It seems that
copyright incentives are, at best, a weak and limited explanation of the creative
production of graffiti artists.
Yet many millions of square feet of illegal graffiti are produced every year,
much to the chagrin of municipal authorities and property owners.80 Thus, if we
are to draw on an economic model for an adequate explanation of the proliferation
of graffiti, incentives must exist outside the exclusive rights conferred by copyright
law. Not only must these incentives be extrinsic to copyright, they must also be

75. See supra Section II.
76. See JEFF FERRELL, CRIMES OF STYLE: URBAN GRAFFITI AND THE POLITICS OF CRIMINALITY
175 (1993) (“Not only are you in danger of getting thrown in jail and fined and such, you don’t get any
money out of it at all.”) (quoting graffiti artist Eye Six).
77. ROSENSTEIN, supra note 2.
78. The location scouts for the television show Law and Order, for example, seek licenses from
graffiti artists whose works appear in the background of the show. Gonzalez, supra note 3. It is not
clear if these licenses are sought for illegal works as well as legal works.
79. See Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 6, Villa
v. Pearson Educ., Inc., No. 03 C 3717, 2003 WL 23801408 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2003) (“Plaintiff has
claimed that his damages are that it appeared that he had ‘sold out to the man.’”); From graffiti to
galleries: Urban artist brings street style to another level, CNN.COM (Nov. 4, 2005, 4:49 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/03/21/otr.green/index.html (“[Working with corporations] destroys your
legitimacy in the art world sometimes -- like people look at you like you’re selling out.”) (quoting artist
Doze Green); Ryan Singel, Sony Draws Ire With PSP Graffiti, WIRED (Dec. 5, 2005),
http://www.wired.com/culture/lifestyle/news/2005/12/69741 (describing artists’ negative reaction to
Sony’s use of graffiti as an advertising medium).
80. See, e.g., Steve Hymon, Graffiti Removal Tallied, L.A. TIMES, March 07, 2009, at A8, available
at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/07/local/me-graffiti7 (more than 7 million square feet if outside
counties are included); Sewell Chan, Taking Aim at Graffiti Tools, N.Y. TIMES CITY ROOM (Aug. 2,
2007, 5:15 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/08/02/with-graffiti-on-the-rise-city-adopts-anew-law/ (City Council estimating that, between 2002 and 2007, the City had removed more than 77
million square feet of graffiti);
W. Texas Cmty Supervision and Corrs Dep’t, Graffiti Wipe Out Q & A, http://www.co.elpaso.tx.us/WTC/gwop.htm (1.5 million square feet removed in El Paso, Texas in 2008)
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powerful enough to overcome the costs, in time, materials,81 and, most importantly,
the risk of criminal prosecution that graffiti artists incur in creating their works.82
The most commonly cited incentive for the production of graffiti is the desire
for fame and recognition, especially among other artists.83 If this is correct, the
graffiti writers’ desires for fame must be substantial in order to overcome the heavy
costs incurred in creating their pieces. This incentive structure can be usefully
analogized to advertising, where a company distributes a (copyrightable) work for
no cost in the hopes of recouping its investment through the positive external
effects of the advertising. Even for profit-driven firms, “zero-price copyright
production is not beyond the pale when it can be justified by some other important
benefit.”84 The advertiser, like the graffiti artist, must “engage viewers (sometimes
against their will) while conveying a particular message . . . .”85 Thus, “[w]hen the
reputation benefits that come from creating and distributing information to the
public outweigh the costs of doing so, there can be a positive return” on
distributing the works for free.86 The distribution of a writer’s tag can itself be an
81. Though many artists do not pay the monetary costs of their materials, instead stealing or
“racking” them, this merely transforms the dollar cost of materials to an increased risk of criminal
penalty. See MARTHA COOPER & HENRY CHALFANT, SUBWAY ART 27 (1984).
82. These punishments can range from minor to quite severe, though there is little evidence of the
application of the most severe punishments. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 640.6 (West 2012) (under
California state law first offenders can be fined up to $1000 and serve 48-200 hours community service;
second offenders receive up to six months jail time, fines up to $2000, and 96-400 hours community
service; third offenders receive up to a year in jail, fines up to $3000 and up to 600 hours community
service. Parents can be liable for fines incurred by juvenile offenders); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 145.60
(McKinney 2012) (under New York state law “making graffiti” is a class A misdemeanor, punishable
by up to a year in jail); Doug MacCash, Vandalism or art? Struggle between graffiti producers and
those who seek to prevent it has flared again, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (July 13, 2008, 10:08 AM),
http://blog.nola.com/doughmaccash/2008/07/vandalism_or_art.html (under Louisiana state law “the
maximum fine increase[d] to $10,000 with a prison term of up to 10 years.”). Artists can also be
punished under criminal mischief statutes, which are often felonies. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §
145.05 (McKinney 2012) (under New York state law, criminal mischief in the third degree, involving
damage to property greater than $250, is a class E felony).
83. See Nat’l Paint & Coatings Ass’n v. City of Chi., 835 F. Supp. 421, 427 (N.D. Ill. 1993), rev’d
45 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir. 1995) (“achieving fame is a significant driving force for writers, as they compete
with each other to obtain status among their peers”); FERRELL, supra note 76 at 12; STEPHEN POWERS,
THE ART OF GETTING OVER: GRAFFITI AT THE MILLENNIUM 6 (1999); B. Drummond Ayres, In a City of
Graffiti, Gangs Turn to Violence to Protect Their Art, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1994, at A20 (quoting a
graffiti artist saying “I write my name up there and then maybe paint a little extra picture around it . . .
and -- KA-POW! -- I’m famous. It’s a real rush.”); E.A. Hanks, An IMtimate Conversation With:
Moustache Man, IMPRUDENT WAYS: BUSY NOTHINGS FROM EA HANKS, (Mar. 4, 2011),
http://impudentways.blogspot.com/2011/03/imtimate-conversation-with-moustache.html (“Tagging is
putting your name up in as many places as possible. . . . Tagging is definitely more of an ego thing.”).
84. Greg Lastowka, Digital Attribution: Copyright and the Right to Credit, 87 B.U. L. REV. 41, 63
(2007); see also Eric Schlachter, The Intellectual Property Renaissance in Cyberspace: Why Copyright
Law Could Be Unimportant on the Internet, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 15, 30 (1997) (explaining how
attribution is necessary for cross-subsidization).
85. Lastowka, supra note 84, at 65.
86. Id. Lastowka ends the sentence as a “positive return on zero investment,” but I think that cannot
be what he means. Advertisers make substantial investments in getting their message out to the public;
it is the price of the informational good that is zero. See also Rosenblatt, supra note 72 at 321 (“[S]ome
creators may create out of a desire for recognition, an interest in community or an ability to avail
themselves of first mover advantages
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incentive to production.87 Artists may write for fame only, even if they do not plan
to leverage that fame into other benefits in the future. The recognition of this sort
of non-monetary utility certainly complicates traditional economic analysis of
production, but also provides a deeper explanation of activities that are
inadequately explained purely by the motive for profit.
The analogy is not just theoretical. “Like advertising, its only rival for breadth
and brashness in the urban landscape, graffiti is the form of visual expression we
see and share all the time.”88 Artists themselves note the similarities between their
work and the advertising that surrounds them.89 Graffiti, in “seek[ing] to leave
‘dissonant tags’ on the slick face of advertising,”90 implicitly recognizes the power
of the advertisements themselves and attempts to appropriate that power to serve
the ends of the graffiti artist. The advertisers, as well, have come to recognize the
power of graffiti-as-advertising.91 And, in an ironic twist, the subways and buses
that were once used to propel an artist to “all-city”92 status now ferry corporations’
advertising to the far ends of those same cities.93
or network effects.”).
87. See Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It’s Due: The Law and Norms of Attribution, 95 GEO. L.J.
49, 56 (2006) (“Attribution is, first, a reward and incentive for future creativity.”). For a broader
discussion of non-copyright incentives to advertise, see Lisa P. Ramsey, Intellectual Property Rights in
Advertising, 12 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 189, 217–23 (2006).
88. Steven Winn, Vandalism or Art?, S.F. GATE, Mar. 7, 2005, at C1, available at
http://www.sfgate.com/entertainment/article/VANDALISM-OR-ART-PART-ONE-The-urge-toexpress-2693657.php.
89. See Susan Farrell, Graffiti Q & A, http://www.artcrimes.com/faq/graffiti_questions.html (last
visited Apr. 19, 2011) (“Another influence on graf[fiti], because it’s in the city, is billboards and store
fronts. In many ways graffiti is just like advertising, and what do you see in advertising?... [sic] [B]ig
words.”).
90. Sonia K. Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 489, 514 (2006) (quoting NAOMI
KLEIN, NO LOGO: TAKING AIM AT THE BRAND BULLIES 285 (1999). In an example of actually leaving
dissonant tags directly on the “face” of advertising, Joseph Patrick Waldo for some time wrote the word
“moustache” in a “distinctive cursive flourish beneath the noses of clean-shaven celebs and models in
various advertisements. Mr. Waldo said that he tagged the ads because “[w]e’re getting these ridiculous
images and dumb catchphrases shoved down our throats, why shouldn’t we be able to talk back? So
many ads are so laughably stupid that a cartoonish moustache just seems to fit.” He was charged with
felony criminal mischief for allegedly causing $1,500 in damages. David Gianatasio, NYC’s
‘Moustache Man’ Subway Ad Vandal Finally Captured, ADWEEK, June 27 2011,
http://www.adweek.com/adfreak/nycs-moustache-man-subway-ad-vandal-finally-captured-132950.
91. Singel, supra note 79; The Mural Kings, http://www.themuralkings.com/tatscru.php, (last
visited Apr. 20, 2011) (“The TATS CRU commercial client list includes Coca Cola, McDonalds,
Reebok, Tommy Hilfiger, Foot Locker, MTV Labs, The House of Seagram’s, Becks, Snapple, FYE,
Chiclets, M&M, Dodge, Comedy Central, Cartoon Network: Adult Swim, Crunch Gym, ABC Carpet &
Home, Firestone, Avirex, MSG, WWF, WNBA’s New York Liberty Team, Victory Outreach, Variety The Children’s Charity, JobDirect, Davis & Warshaw, LUGZ, Ritmo Latino, Affinity Health Plan,
AmeriGroup, Urban Health Plan, and EAB Bank.”).
92. A “title of reverence reserved for the graffiti artist that gained visual prominence throughout all
five boroughs of New York City.” Amos Klausner, Bombing Modernism: Graffiti and its Relationship
to the (Built) Environment, http://www.core77.com/development/reactor/04.07_klausner.asp (last visited
Apr. 19, 2011).
93. See, e.g., Advertising & Telecommunications, METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY,
http://www.mta.info/mta/realestate/ad_tele.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2012) (“Direct your message to
the millions of people each day who use the MTA system.”); Rail and Subway Advertising, CBS
OUTDOOR, https://www.cbsoutdoor.com/media/transit/railsubway/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2012) (selling
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There is good anecdotal evidence that the investment in prolific “advertising”
by graffiti artists pays dividends. The most well-known artists have gone on to
careers in the fine arts,94 graphic design, or have transitioned to commissioned,
legal graffiti.95 Artists attempting to make the transition to legal artistic careers,
however, often draw the ire of the authorities they previously avoided through
anonymity. For example, in 2003, Blake Lethem was hired by then-Presidential
candidate Howard Dean to paint a mural background for a speech. Once his
picture made it into the newspaper in an article about the speech and the mural, a
New York detective recognized him and had him arrested for tagging subway trains
more than four years prior.96 Alain Maridueña, an artist who had been invited to
speak at several universities and whose art had been exhibited in galleries, and who
claimed to have stopped producing illegal works in 1994, was arrested in 2006 after
his KET tag started reappearing on illegal subway graffiti.97 Still, at least some
artists seem to be willing to bear these costs in order to make the transition to
legitimate careers.
What does all this tell us about our incentive theory of copyright? As
Lastowka argues, perhaps “our legal attitude toward information goods distributed
at zero price to promote reputations is substantially different than our attitude
toward information goods distributed for sale.”98 When dealing with zero price
information goods, the role of the law “shifts from the copyright model of creating
property-based creation incentives to the communication model of protecting
reputation and preventing deception.”99 While the dearth of legal claims brought
by graffiti artists prevents testing whether this claim applies as a matter of doctrine,
as a theory of production it fits nicely with the facts. Graffiti artists create without
the incentive provided by copyright and with limited ability to monetize their work.
Thus, the fact that the standard monetary incentives assumed under the traditional
economic production model for informational goods are not present in the creation

subway advertising including “Rail & Subway Exterior” and “Station Domination” which “are sure to
be remembered . . . [w]hether in the stations or rolling near highways . . .”).
94. Examples include Keith Haring, Jean-Michel Basquiat, Banksy, Dondi and Futura.
95. See Nat’l Paint & Coatings Ass’n v. City of Chi., 835 F. Supp. 421, 426 (N.D. Ill. 1993)
(“[Artists] in their 20s and 30s . . . tend to be involved in larger and legal projects.”); Schwender, supra
note 13, at 263 (describing commercial and artistic success of graffiti artists); Marisa A. Gómez, Note,
The Writing on Our Walls: Finding Solutions Through Distinguishing Graffiti Art from Graffiti
Vandalism, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 633, 641 (1993) (describing display and sale of graffiti in
galleries, art exhibitions, etc.); Sewell Chan, A Sociologist’s Look at Graffiti, N.Y. TIMES CITY ROOM
BLOG (Feb. 17, 2009, 7:15 AM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/17/a-new-look-at-graffitiwriters-lives/ (“Many writers have taken their illegal youthful pursuits and turned them into legal adult
careers.”) (quoting Professor Gregory Snyder). See also Hanks, supra note 83 (“People say street artists
these days are only in it to eventually get gallery shows and make money, and that might be true for
some people.”).
96. Tina Kelley, Graffiti Artist Who Created Dean Mural Is Held, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2003, at B2,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/08/nyregion/graffiti-artist-who-created-dean-mural-isheld.html.
97. Thomas J. Lueck, Graffiti Figure Admired as Artist Now Faces Vandalism Charges, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 19, 2007, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/19/nyregion/19grafitti.html.
Maridueña claimed it was the work of copycats trading in on his fame. Id.
98. Lastowka, supra note 84, at 66.
99. Id.
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of copyright is perhaps less troubling for the theory than it first seems. We can
instead construct a theory of production that revolves around maximizing
dissemination of the artist’s work and minimizing false attribution. It does seem as
though the major concerns of the artists are attribution and distribution.100
A psychic reward for artistic expression itself could constitute another
incentive that drives graffiti artists to create,101 but as Rebecca Tushnet points out,
one must be careful not to conflate incentives and preferences, otherwise the
economic model of production loses its explanatory power.102 Preferences for
artistic creation, endogenous to individual creators, are not necessarily responsive
to the incentive system set up by copyright. Incentives may skew which of a
diverse set of preferences people choose to act on or aggregate preferences in order
to shape behavior,103 but the incentive model requires that preferences be
endogenous to creators. Otherwise, the theory becomes circular and the models of
behavior become true, but trivial.
2. Optimizing the Societal Level of Production
Having traced a plausible economic account of why these works are created
largely outside of the incentive structure of copyright, the second question is what
level of intellectual property protection would optimize the level of production of
these works. The first difficulty in answering this question is that the optimal level
of production of graffiti art involves a normative judgment, and the two sides of the
debate are in deep opposition. Many do not think even legally created graffiti is
acceptable.104 Others advocate for the legalization of graffiti entirely.
Due to these conflicting preferences, it is difficult to develop a model of the
social welfare function as it relates to graffiti art. The creation of graffiti in public
places generates both positive externalities for those who enjoy it and negative
externalities for those who dislike it.105 Even with good data, these externalities
100. See sources cited supra note 83. Indeed the vast majority of pieces consist solely of the artist’s
pseudonym, though painted intricately.
101. See Nat’l Paint & Coatings Ass’n v. City of Chi., 835 F. Supp. 421, 427 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Hanks,
supra note 83 (“But there’s still a good population in New York putting art on the street for no
commercial gain- for the sole purpose of beautifying the city.”).
102. Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 513, 520–22 (2009).
103. For example, if someone has a preference for both creation and money, adding a monetary
incentive to creation may induce that person to create where they otherwise would not (i.e. where just
the utility in creation did not outweigh its costs).
104. Tracy v. Skate Key, Inc., No. 86 CIV. 3439 (MBM), 1990 WL 9855, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2,
1990) (Defendant removed paid-for mural from its wall after complaints from a local civic organization
“condemned [the] plaintiff’s genre as graffiti . . . .”); Lueck, supra note 97 (City of New York revoked a
party permit upon learning artists had been hired to paint graffiti at the party on metal sheets that looked
like subway cars); Rob Wildeboer, Mural Artist Mulling Legal Action, WBEZ (May 18, 2009),
http://www.wbez.org/story/news/mural-artist-mulling-legal-action (describing how a City of Chicago
alderman ordered the city’s graffiti cleanup crew to remove a mural created on private property).
105. The model can be complicated further still by considering wider societal effects extrinsic to
personal preferences. For example, graffiti’s public nature and prevalence “increases the likelihood that
someone will see, hear, or think the world differently,” contributing positively to the overall culture.
See Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1151, 1190
(2007). It may also create a generalized and diffuse sense of disrepair and disorder and thus harm the
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would be difficult to quantify in a meaningful way. Graffiti also imposes
significant monetary costs on property owners and municipalities,106 who are
forced to pay for cleanup. None of these costs are internalized by the creators of
the works. Thus, the optimum level of graffiti is more difficult to determine than in
other intellectual property contexts, where maximizing some relevant metric, such
as the production of creative work or the pace of innovation, can serve as a useful
proxy for maximizing the social welfare function. As a matter of pure theory, it is
impossible to determine whether it would be better for the incidence of graffiti to
rise or fall. With this in mind, I examine what the likely effects of extending and
denying copyright protection to graffiti would be.
If we imagine that graffiti had full and well-known copyright protection, the
result would likely not be much different from the status quo. Taking the graffitias-advertising model discussed above, there is only a shallow market for licensing
illegally created works for profit. Instead, the works are created in order to
promote the artist and create reputational equity. In this context, the most
important aspect of intellectual property law for the “advertiser” is attribution.107
The Copyright Act only provides limited rights of attribution under the Visual
Artists Rights Act (VARA),108 which requires the work to be of “recognized
stature” to receive protection. For a variety of reasons, graffiti art is unlikely to be
protected under VARA.109 Thus, copyright recognition is unlikely significantly to

sense of safety and well-being of community members, and perhaps even lead to an increase in more
serious crime, as argued by the influential (and controversial) “broken windows” theory of crime. See
George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Mar. 1982),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/.
106. The money that municipalities spend on cleaning up graffiti may actually be a useful way to
quantify the negative externalities created by graffiti art. To posit a simplistic model, if we assume that
citizens elect city officials who are perfect agents, then the money spent on eliminating graffiti and
prosecuting or otherwise penalizing graffiti producers would be at the point where the marginal costs of
additional cleanup equal the marginal value. The model would work less well for property owners, who
are often fined for failing to clean up graffiti, which distorts the value they place on cleanup expressed
as their willingness to do so. In practice, a two-level principal-agent problem likely causes a significant
overstatement of how much the public values less graffiti. Legislators can promise to prosecute writers
and clean up graffiti and the costs of those promises are well hidden, especially the costs of
prosecutions, which are subsumed in the general budget for local district attorneys. To the extent they
can displace those costs further onto private property owners by forcing them to clean up graffiti with
the threat of fines or penalties they are likely to do so to an inefficient extent because the costs are
further hidden from the voting public.
107. See Schlachter, supra note 84, at 30 (“[F]or cross-subsidization to work, buyers impressed with
product X (freely given away) must be led to product Y (for sale). In most cases, this will mean that
product X must give proper attribution to the seller of product Y so that buyers can make the
connection.”).
108. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2008).
109. See Botello v. Shell Oil Co., 229 Cal. App. 3d 1130, 1134 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (analyzing a
similar California statute and stating, in dicta, that the statute “obviously does not apply to graffiti,
which . . . is hardly classifiable as ‘fine art,’ and which is the subject of several criminal laws.”) (internal
citations omitted); Michelle Bougdanos, Note, The Visual Artists Rights Act and Its Application to
Graffiti Murals: Whose Wall Is It Anyway?, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 549, 550–51 (2002)
(discussing why graffiti is unlikely to meet the recognized stature requirement).
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interact with artists’ reputational motivations to produce graffiti.110
The deterrent effects of extending or denying copyright protection to graffiti
are similarly insubstantial. The difficulty of monetizing graffiti production
indicates that the exclusive rights given by copyright are not likely to be strong
incentives for the production of works. Assuming that graffiti is currently
protected by copyright, one might argue that formally removing protection might
aid efforts to curb the incidence of graffiti, but since writers do not get much of an
affirmative benefit from copyright protection, explicitly denying protection is
unlikely to be a significant additional deterrent.
Advancing copyright protection could paradoxically decrease the overall
production of graffiti. “[I]f a sufficient incentive exists without an intellectual
property entitlement, the addition of that entitlement can actually retard
production.”111 Withholding protection in this context leads to increased piracy
and copying, and thus increased dissemination. Therefore, adding well-known
protection might limit overall production—a counter-intuitive positive outcome for
graffiti’s opponents.112 However, this explanation depends on whether or not
infringers are likely to be sued.113 Given the difficulty of finding them, the costs of
federal court, and the limited resources of most graffiti artists to sue on their own
behalf, the additional disincentive from granting protection to graffiti would likely
be marginal.114 Nevertheless, automatic propertization of a work will necessarily
impede “otherwise frictionless proliferation,” even if the magnitude of that effect is
small.115
This leads to an interesting conclusion, namely, that the incentives created by
copyright are likely to have relatively little impact on this form of creative
production, whether given or withheld. Given most of the literature’s treatment of
the incentive structure created by the copyright law as the primary source of
explanatory power in the economic model of intellectual property, finding an
example that seems to operate independently of the law casts at least some doubt
on the emphasis given to the traditional economic explanation of copyright law.116

110. This is a good example of a case where intellectual property protection is not the exclusive
driver of innovation because other effects predominate the production of a given good. See Rosenblatt,
supra note 72 at 321.
111. Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside of Intellectual Property’s Downside, 57
UCLA L. REV. 921, 962 (2010); see also Belcher v. Tarbox, 486 F.2d 1087, 1088 n.3 (9th Cir. 1973)
(“Copyright protection restricts permissible publication. We fail to see what public policy would be
served by eliminating this restriction in the case of fraudulent matter and permitting it to be reprinted
and circulated freely.”).
112. See Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 111, at 965 (“[G]iving intellectual property rights to an
industry that has little need for an incentive can be counterproductive because the negative effects of the
entitlement predominate--such as the deadweight loss that results from higher prices and lower
production. When dealing with a disfavored industry, however, counterproductive is good.”).
113. See id. at 965–66 (explaining that producers who care little about the incentive effects of
copyright are unlikely to exercise it).
114. See id.
115. Id. at 966.
116. This insight has been noted with increasing frequency in recent scholarship, however. See
generally Rosenblatt, supra note 72 and sources cited therein.
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B. Non-Economic Theories
Though economic theories of intellectual property protection are traditionally
favored in the American legal framework,117 other authors have explored the noneconomic interests that bound up with property generally,118 and with intellectual
property in particular.119 This section will examine whether these theories can help
to explain the creation of graffiti, and whether they give a justification for
intellectual property protection for graffiti. All of these theories speak to a similar
set of interests; however, non-economic interests of graffiti artists are at crosspurposes within the current structure of the copyright law. As such, I will provide
a brief description of the interests at issue, and then discuss with more particularity
the values that each theory promotes and why they may or may not justify a grant
of intellectual property rights.
The two major interests of graffiti artists that come into conflict are control and
transgression. Artists would like to be able to control their work, and prevent it
from being used without their permission, either through someone else making
money through the use of their work or using it in such a way as to dilute or alter
its meaning. Failing to recognize copyright means that the work can be exploited
by others for commercial gain without the consent of the artists.120 Inasmuch as
many graffiti writers have strong non-commercial and anti-corporate ideologies,
allowing others to use their works to make their own money or fame would deprive
the artists of both potential revenue and their personhood interests in their
creations.121 Either they must rely on the apparatus of the state they critique to
protect their interests, or they cede the rights to their works to the public domain,
and thus to commercial entities who are in the best position to exploit the works.122
Reliance on the state to protect their interests in not being exploited is
antagonistic to their other major interest, transgression. Many artists believe that
the value of their work derives, in part, from its illegal nature.123 Inasmuch as the
117. See Tushnet, supra note 102, at 517.
118. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
119. See generally Justin Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual
Property, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81 (1998); Tushnet, supra note 102.
120. Cf. Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CALIF. L.
REV. 1331, 1334–35 (2004) (arguing that the public domain can be a tool for appropriating the “labor
and bodies of the disempowered”).
121. Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 6, Villa v.
Pearson Educ., Inc., No. 03 C 3717, 2003 WL 23801408 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2003) (“Plaintiff has claimed
that his damages are that it appeared that he had ‘sold out to the man.’”).
122. See Chander & Sunder, supra note 120, at 1341 (noting that the public domain is preferentially
exploited by those who have the resources to do so).
123. See, e.g., Matthew Shaer, Pixnit Was Here, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 3, 2007, at D1, available at
http://www.boston.com/ae/theater_arts/articles/2007/01/03/pixnit_was_here/ (“‘My work is illegal. . . .
[T]he illegality is what gives it its bite.’”) (quoting Pixnit); Nina Siegal, From the Subways to the
Streets, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1999, at 1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/08/22/nyregion/from-the-subways-to-the-streets.html (“[T]he
adventurers among the young graffiti writers . . . say legal walls and city-sponsored art programs are
about as enticing as a trip to a suburban mall.”); Farrell, supra note 89 (“I don’t personally consider
legal murals pieces of graffiti.”); Jowy Romano, The Man Behind the Moustache, SUBWAY ART BLOG
(May 5, 2011), http://subwayartblog.com/2011/05/05/the-man-behind-the-moustache/ (“[I]t’s evolved
into part of this broader movement of subverting advertisements.”).

46

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:1

recognition of a copyright puts the government’s “power, endorsement and
support”124 behind a work, the personality interests of artists who intentionally put
themselves outside of the legal system would be diminished by legal recognition.
Conduct against property which is “clearly and self-consciously illegal . . .
represent[s] a . . . direct and serious challenge to the legal order . . . .”125 Some
graffiti has explicit political content,126 but even graffiti that is not directly political
makes a species of political statement.127 It represents an opposition to the
boundaries of property and to the political system that criminalizes it. People who
Eduardo Peñalver and Sonia Katyal term “expressive outlaws” are implicitly
suggesting a challenge to the legal status quo.128 Assuming that recognizing
copyrightability in a work lends it some degree of government-sponsored
legitimacy,129 the difficulty is that “legitimiz[ing], ex ante, the lawbreaker’s activity
would radically undermine the expressive message itself. . . . [T]o legitimize the
disobedience would therefore dilute, and even counteract, the message’s
vitality.”130
1. Personhood/Personality
For the personhood theory, the question of whether and to what extent to grant
intellectual property rights hinges on whether or not the grant would assist the
creator in his or her autonomous personal development. Margaret Jane Radin
argues “to achieve proper self-development — to be a person — an individual
needs some control over resources in the external environment.”131 Furthermore,
“public exhibition of such control permits us to communicate that autonomy to our
fellow citizens.”132 For the graffiti artist, each piece that is created is imbued, to an
extent, with the personhood of that artist. A piece also represents control, not over
the piece itself, but over the property on which it is placed.133 It is a reaction to the
control of physical property by established property-owners, which “systemically
prevent[s] prospective personhood interests from developing.”134
This is a normative claim, but also has positive implications. It predicts that
124. Belcher v. Tarbox, 486 F.2d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 1973) (Wallace, J., concurring and dissenting).
125. EDUARDO MOISÉ PEÑALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS: HOW SQUATTERS,
PIRATES, AND PROTESTERS IMPROVE THE LAW OF OWNERSHIP 87 (2010).
126. See, e.g., Making Fun of Qaddafi, FOREIGN POL’Y (Apr. 7, 2011),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/07/style_wars; A1ONE, We Hide Atom Bomb: Urban
Communication in the Way of an Iranian, http://tehranwalls.blogspot.com/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2011).
127. See Peter Applebome, How Graffiti Goats Became a Symbol of . . . Something, N.Y. TIMES
(March 2, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/03/nyregion/graffiti-goats-in-kingston-ny-find-afollowing.html (noting “how fast images can spread in the digital world and how quickly they can come
to stand for many different things, even if they began as standing for nothing . . . .”); Farrell, supra note
89 (“When it is illegal it is a political statement, whether the kid knows it who’s doing it or not.”).
128. See PEÑALVER & KATYAL, supra note 125, at 138-140.
129. See Belcher v. Tarbox, 486 F.2d at 1090.
130. PEÑALVER & KATYAL, supra note 125, at 139
131. Radin, supra note 118, at 957.
132. PEÑALVER & KATYAL, supra note 125, at 26.
133. Nat’l Paint & Coatings Ass’n v. City of Chi., 835 F. Supp. 421, 427 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (noting that
one of the “values” that graffiti writers pursue is the “sense of individual power a writer obtains by
controlling various surfaces with his name.”) (emphasis added).
134. Hughes, supra note 119, at 87.
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when individuals lack control over resources in their environment, they are likely
to attempt to gain some sort of control over those resources, assuming that people
desire to achieve self-development. Indeed, this is what we see in graffiti art. To
the graffiti artists “a blank wall in the city represents many more bad things than
any writing on it could.”135 It represents the control of the owners of property that
the writer lacks, so the writer symbolically “takes” the property by putting his/her
mark on it. As one court put it, one of the “values” that graffiti writers pursue is
the “sense of individual power a writer obtains by controlling various surfaces with
his name.”136
The power relations endemic to graffiti art help to explain why it arouses such
deep opposition on the part of property owners and law enforcement. It is not
necessarily that the content of graffiti itself is distasteful to the property owner. It
is rather the symbolic content, the idea that the owners’ assertions of property
rights are much less secure and stable than they would like to believe. Since
property ownership is perhaps the most common indicator of relative status,137 the
writer’s tag on a building creates status insecurity for owners, who then react
strongly in order to preserve the status-signaling effects of property. The graffiti is
“a symbolic expression of social disorder, and relatedly, a failure of the promise of
the order of law.”138 It suggests that the absolute ability to exclude that is the
foundation of a property right is not as absolute as the legal and social system
suggests, and thus creates a profound sense of unease and insecurity. As one artist
insightfully notes, people who paint over the graffiti “don’t understand is that they
are expressing themselves just as much as we are . . . .”139 By cleaning up graffiti,
owners are publicly and self-consciously re-asserting their own control and, thus,
their own property-related autonomy.
Personhood-type analysis fits well with the actual practice of graffiti. The
desire to put one’s name on any available surface is a means of asserting symbolic
control over the visible aspects of property, and of forcing the public to recognize
the “failure of the promise of the order of law.”140 By making property owners and
the broader public uncomfortable in their own sense of the inviolability of property,
the writer takes some of the incidents of property for herself, and thus exerts “some
control over resources in the external environment.”141 Thus, the graffiti artist
gives voice to her discontent with the overall system of law, even if the message is
not self-consciously a critique of the political or social system.
Under this conception, then, writers create as a symbolic act, to show that, like
135. Farrell, supra note 89; see also Simon Romero, At War With São Paulo’s Establishment, Black
Paint in Hand, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/29/world/americas/atwar-with-sao-paulos-establishment-black-paint-in-hand.html (quoting a São Paulo’s pichação artist as
saying, “[w]e take our risks to remind society that this city is a visual aggression to begin with, and
hostile to anyone who is not rich.”).
136. Nat’l Paint & Coatings Ass’n, 835 F. Supp. at 427 (emphasis added).
137. See Nestor M. Davidson, Property and Relative Status, 107 MICH. L. REV. 757, 761 (2009)
(“[P]roperty serves as an important locus for symbolic meaning.”). Indeed, ownership may be the most
primordial means of status signaling.
138. Katyal, supra note 90, at 500.
139. Farrell, supra note 89 (emphasis added).
140. Katyal, supra note 90, at 500.
141. Radin, supra note 118, at 957.
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Kilroy,142 they too were there, not just the property owners. In Katyal’s
terminology, they “recode” 143 the symbolic message of the property they write on,
dispelling the hegemonic notion of perfectly excludable property144 that the blank
wall represents to them. Does this present a justification for granting intellectual
property rights? Recall that recognizing that personhood is bound up with property
“does not compel the conclusion that property for personhood deserves moral
recognition or legal protection . . . .”145 Though at first blush, it seems like granting
a privilege to graffiti artists might be a way to, in some sense, even the playing
field between established property owners and symbolic dissenters, the recognition
of a copyright in illegally created works may actually blunt the dialectic between
property and subversion in an unproductive way.
To see why, it is first important to note that granting a copyright to illegally
created work also entails a fundamental legal recognition of the work as a work.
Thus, the recognition that a work created illegally is copyrightable also necessarily
entails recognition of potential liability for infringement.146 As graffiti art “has
been mainstreamed to a large degree[,]”147 an intellectual property right may inure
to the benefit of established artists, who have the resources and legal legitimacy to
sue illegal artists for infringement, and their contacts in the community might allow
them to find such artists even more easily than the police. Functionally, a
copyright for illegal graffiti might only entail the right to be sued.
The recognition of a copyright might also, paradoxically, reduce the artist’s
personhood interests. As will be discussed further below,148 many artists believe
that the value of their work derives, wholly or in part, from its illegality.149
Inasmuch as granting a copyright puts the government’s “power, endorsement and
support”150 behind a work, the personality interests of artists who intentionally put
themselves outside of the legal system would be diminished by legal recognition.
It is also important to consider the effects of graffiti on the personhood
interests of the property owners. While it is tempting to caricature property owners
as an undifferentiated mass representing the “establishment” in the abstract, a full
142. See ERIC PARTRIDGE, A DICTIONARY OF CATCH PHRASES 132 (1977); Kilroy was here,
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kilroy_was_here (last visited Feb. 13, 2011).
143. Katyal, supra note 90, at 501.
144. Randall Bezanson & Andrew Finkelman, Trespassory Art, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 245, 269–
73 (2010) (describing the centrality of control and possession of land to the historical development of
property law); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730,
730 (arguing that the right to exclude is the “sine qua non” of property).
145. Radin, supra note 118, at 961.
146. This presents an unusual, if interesting, solution to the problem of insufficient penalties for art
vandalism presented by M.J. Williams in his Note, Framing Art Vandalism: A Proposal to Address
Violence Against Art, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 581 (2009). If copyrights in illegally created works are
recognized, the creator of a vandalized work could sue the vandal for creating an unauthorized
derivative work, and seek statutory damages.
147. Bezanson & Finkelman, supra note 144, at 257; see also Romero, supra note 135 (noting that
São Paulo’s pichação artists practice their unique form of graffiti in part because “colorful graffiti — in
their view at least — is a lesser form of expression, easy to do on street level and often co-opted by the
commercial art scene.”).
148. See infra Section III.B.ii.
149. See sources cited supra note 123.
150. Belcher v. Tarbox, 486 F.2d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 1973) (Wallace, J., concurring and dissenting).
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theory must recognize that they also have legitimate personhood interests in their
property which are violated by illegal graffiti art. Academic works on graffiti art
tend to mythologize the artists, and “in marked contrast to the multidimensional
and sympathetic interpretation of the graffiti writers’ activities, assertions, and
arguments, anti-graffiti campaigners and ‘average persons’ amount to onedimensional ciphers of a one-dimensional culture.”151 “If the perpetration of the
graffiti warrants such detailed and celebratory empirical attention . . . why does not
the same requirement apply to those who resist the writers and motivate themselves
to produce alternative aesthetic motifs in the same urban environment?”152
Legitimizing illegal graffiti through the copyright system would subvert to some
extent the interest that property owners have in developing their own personhood,
reducing their perceived control of something to which they believe they have a
legitimate right and undermining their own sense of self. This concern is
magnified by the fact that the incidence of graffiti is likely higher in poorer
neighborhoods with less access to police and other services, and thus its burdens
may fall disproportionately on owners who are themselves poor.153 Local property
owners’ efforts to eliminate graffiti reflect their desire to live in a particular
aesthetic environment and develop their own sense of personhood through the use
and development of their property, and those interests are as relevant and important
as the interests of the graffiti artists themselves.
2. Democracy and Dissent
Many academic accounts of urban graffiti have noted its role as a vehicle for
self-expression of disadvantaged groups and outward expression of political
dissent.154 Conduct against property which is “clearly and self-consciously illegal .
. . represent[s] a . . . direct and serious challenge to the legal order . . . .”155 Graffiti
has explicit and implicit political content.156 It represents an opposition to the
boundaries of property and to the political system that criminalizes it. These
“expressive outlaws” mount a challenge to the legal status quo through the
transgression of traditional notions of property.157 Although Katyal and Penalver
are speaking of individuals who self-consciously express an opposition to a
particular legal norm, such as institutionalized race discrimination, by challenging
directly the law they oppose,158 the analysis also applies to expressions of more
generalized political dissent or discontent.

151. Martin O’Brien, What Is Cultural About Cultural Criminology?, 45 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 599,
603 (2005) (referring to FERRELL, supra note 76).
152. Id. at 603–04; see also Farrell, supra note 89 (noting that painting over graffiti is its own type of
self-expression).
153. See PEÑALVER & KATYAL, supra note 125, at 146 (“Because outlaws typically operate in their
own neighborhoods, the result might be actions that perversely make the situation of the poor as a whole
even worse.”).
154. See generally FERRELL, supra note 76.
155. PEÑALVER & KATYAL, supra note 125, at 87.
156. See sources cited supra note126; Farrell, supra note 89 (“When it is illegal it is a political
statement, whether the kid knows it who’s doing it or not.”).
157. See PEÑALVER & KATYAL, supra note 125, at 139.
158. Id.
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Katyal notes that the enhanced protection of intellectual property rights creates
space for individuals to engage in cultural production “past the boundaries of
cultural dissent and into the boundaries of asserted illegality.”159 The expansion of
property control necessarily creates its own doppelganger; the realm of prohibited
content expands in linear relation to the protection of content. In the context of
graffiti art, the situation is further complicated. Graffiti is labeled as vandalism, a
label which “suggests an important choice . . . between tangible property and
intangible expression.”160 The fact that graffiti exists on the privately owned
property of another “is yet another emblem of its transgressive potential, a tabula
rasa that both enables, and creates, its intended message of subversion.”161
Katyal and Penalver, in creating a taxonomy of dissent through property
violation, note that one of the values of property transgressions is their
informational quality.162 They illustrate the depth of dissatisfaction with the
current political or legal system,163 though in the case of property transgressions
that are not targeted as a specific legal edifice, the message is muddled by the
variety of motivations that people have for engaging in the transgressive behavior.
In comparison to the lunch counter sit-ins, where the transgressive behavior was
clearly targeted at the regime of segregation in the American South,164 graffiti
expresses only generalized discontent. As discussed above, some graffiti artists
may not be dissenting at all, but rather making a risky investment in a future artistic
career.165 Without a coherent theory of why individuals engage in graffiti art, it is
difficult to tell what the proper societal response would be.
Nonetheless, the existence and prevalence of graffiti gives us, to an extent,
information about the depth and breadth of a particular group’s dissatisfaction with
the current scheme of property distribution. The goal, then, should be to “preserve
the expressive and communicative value of the disobedience in such a way that the
law (1) reduces spillover effects and (2) avoids diluting the message . . . .”166 In
this context, the criminal sanctions against graffiti should be preserved. That
mitigates the negative effect the transgression has on property owners while
preserving the message by maintaining its transgressive content. The power of the
message comes, in part, from the willingness of the writer to risk criminal sanction
to create it.
If, as this suggests, graffiti is a vector of dissent among a particular subgroup
of society and that even graffiti with no overt political message still contains an
implicit social-political critique, the implication for recognizing it as copyrightable
may be to rob it of its transgressive power and political or semiotic significance.
Assuming that recognizing copyrightability in a work lends it some degree of

159. Katyal, supra note 90, at 492.
160. Id. at 520.
161. Id.
162. PEÑALVER & KATYAL, supra note 125, at 159-160.
163. For instance, the startling prevalence of pichação in Brazilian cities suggests a deep discontent
with the class system and the division of property in the society. See Romero, supra note135.
164. See PEÑALVER & KATYAL, supra note 125, at 64–70.
165. See supra notes 80-81.
166. PEÑALVER & KATYAL, supra note 125, at 159.
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government-sponsored legitimacy,167 the difficulty is that “legitimiz[ing], ex ante,
the lawbreaker’s activity would radically undermine the expressive message itself. .
. . [T]o legitimize the disobedience would therefore dilute, and even counteract, the
message’s vitality.”168 It is important to keep in mind that here that the issue is not
legalizing or decriminalizing the creation of graffiti itself, which would likely have
substantial effects on its perceived transgressive nature, but rather granting
exclusive rights in the work separate from the conditions of its creation. It is not
self-evident that copyright recognition involves a significant legitimizing effect on
the work in question. As the cases demonstrating the copyrightability of fraudulent
and obscene materials show,169 the government’s grant of a copyright does not
necessarily put the imprimatur of the state on a given work. With the elimination
of copyright formalities,170 copyright now vests immediately on the creation of any
work with a modicum of creativity and there is simply no way that is intended to
suggest that the government endorses every copyrightable work created in the
country.171
There are also significant political concerns if the copyright in graffiti is not
recognized. As the cases from the introduction demonstrate, if graffiti does not
have copyright then it is easier for others to co-opt the expression of the graffiti
artist and use it as their own without any compensation, or even attribution, to the
artist. Failing to recognize a copyright in graffiti could then have the effect of
legitimizing its co-option but not its creation. While there would remain significant
obstacles to artists enforcing their rights as against corporations or others who seek
to use their art without permission—most significantly the criminal penalties which
could attach when an author identifies him or herself—recognition of such a right
could at least blunt the potential for the co-option of graffiti by the interests it is
meant to critique. There could be positive side effects, though, if companies did
not have to worry about copyrightability. The art could be disseminated to a much
larger audience, and we would expect that disseminators would be able to charge
much less for it if they did not have to procure licenses or risk infringement
liability.
Graffiti, or at least the graffiti style, has already been significantly co-opted,172
so it is an open question how great this effect would be. People’s encounters with
graffiti writing in advertising, as well as simply having been exposed to it for more
than four decades, may have blunted its symbolic message.173 On the other hand,
167. Belcher v. Tarbox, 486 F.2d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 1973) (Wallace, J., concurring and dissenting).
168. PEÑALVER & KATYAL, supra note 125, at 139.
169. See supra Section II.B.
170. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2008) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine
or device.”).
171. And in other countries as well. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 104–104A (detailing copyright
protection for works created in other nations).
172. See supra notes 81 and 104.
173. We are now to the point where graffiti can get a forty year retrospective in a major art museum,
though not without some controversy. See Adam Nagourney, Admirers Call It Art, But the Police Call
It a Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2011, at A9 (“[G]raffiti is so yesterday.”) (quoting Los Angeles
Police Officer Jack Richter).
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the breadth of current anti-graffiti cleanup campaigns, as well as the depth of
continued opposition to graffiti seems to demonstrate that it retains a great deal of
its transgressive force.
3. Economies of Desire
Rebecca Tushnet’s distinctive conception of the urge to create comports very
well with the lived experience of graffiti artists. She explores a wide variety of
authors’ descriptions of why they write to arrive at a “thick” description of
creativity.174 Many have the feel of addiction or other forms of involuntary
action,175 and many others share a sense of needing to make a lasting impression on
the world.176 In a nice bit of circularity, one of the sources Tushnet quotes
references some of the earliest graffiti to explain that authors create out of “vanity –
the ‘Kilroy was here’ pleasure of changing something in the world, just to see my
imprint on it. Making a mark on the world is a common human desire.”177
The twin explanations of involuntary desire and the need to leave a lasting
mark on the world are common among graffiti artists who explain why they write.
That graffiti artists share with authors and other creators the desire to leave a mark
is obvious; it is no accident that Shirky’s quote mentions the early “Kilroy was
here” graffiti. Oddly enough, because of the likelihood that it will be painted over,
graffiti is perhaps less suited for leaving one’s mark than these other forms of
creativity.178
The feeling that graffiti writers need to write, that it is a type of addiction or
possession, is even more common in accounts they give of why they create. “You
go out on the street at night, and you feel like the city is singing your name . . .
You’re out there tagging your name, boom, boom, boom, and you get it, the fever.
Everyone who does graffiti gets the fever at some point.”179 “It’s an addiction. I
get out of the shower and I’m tagging the fogged up mirror. I find myself tracing
tags without thinking on the train, at school, wherever. I get antsy if I don’t write
for awhile.”180 Graffiti writers’ motivations for creating works, like those of many
other authors, seem to exist outside of the traditional story of incentives in the
copyright.
174. Tushnet, supra note 102, at 522–27.
175. See id. at 523–24 (“I had to keep writing or else I would die. . . I was driven to it by some force
outside my control. . . . Because I was possessed.”) (quoting MARGARET ATWOOD, NEGOTIATING WITH
THE DEAD: A WRITER ON WRITING xx–xxii (2002)).
176. See id. (“To thumb my nose at Death. . . . To make a name that would survive death. . . .”
(quoting MARGARET ATWOOD, NEGOTIATING WITH THE DEAD: A WRITER ON WRITING xx–xxii (2002);
“It provides some sort of primal verification: you are in print; therefore you exist.” (quoting ANNE
LAMOTT, BIRD BY BIRD: SOME INSTRUCTIONS ON WRITING AND LIFE, xiv (1994))
177. Id. at 525 n.36 (quoting CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF ORGANIZING
WITHOUT ORGANIZATIONS 132 (2008).
178. See Farrell, supra note 89 (“[G]raffiti is a temporary art form, like improvisational theatre. You
take pictures of your pieces to remember them, and share them with other writers, but you know that
your piece soon will be gone.”).
179. Siegal, supra note 123 .
180. Interview with J.R., Graffiti Artist, in N.Y., N.Y. (Mar. 15, 2010); see also Ayres, supra note
83, at A20 (“Sometimes when I’m walking down the street and I see this bare wall, the urge hits me and,
like, I just can’t control it.”) (quoting graffiti artist Alex Alvarez).
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Indeed, the rhetorical question that Tushnet asks about the motivation of fan
fiction writers applies, with only slight alteration, to graffiti writers; “[w]hy would
[graffiti writers] spend . . . so much time, energy, and even money on endeavors
that cannot bring monetary return, and often invite scorn from outsiders?”181
Though there is perhaps a greater likelihood of monetary return for graffiti writers
than writers of fan fiction,182 Tushnet’s creative desire framework of artistic
creation comports much better with artists’ actual reported reasons for creation than
does the economic account.
In the case of graffiti art, like fan fiction, the implication is that “[c]opyright
law, even in its own economic terms, plays a minor role, and not necessarily a
positive one.”183 In this sense, the economies of desire are a story of production,
not of justification. These narratives explain why artists create, but not why they
should be afforded protection. If anything, the role of copyright in graffiti art is
even more minor than in fan fiction, whose authors of necessity draw on
copyrighted works. Graffiti artist’s creative inputs are either not copyrighted, or
are copyrighted but very unlikely to have those copyrights enforced. In this case,
where there is a vast supply of creative energy, injecting copyright into the realm
does not seem likely to have positive effects, and could work to undermine the
communality of the writers184 by creating the possibility of disputes over
ownership.185
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR COPYRIGHT DOCTRINE
Overall, it seems the interests of the creators of graffiti art would not be wellserved by the structure of the copyright system. Their main interests, namely
attribution and dissemination, operate mostly outside of, and often in opposition to,
the current scheme of copyright protection. Still, copyright could protect
significant personhood and political interests by allowing artists to stop
unauthorized reproduction and dissemination of their works, if their desire to do so
was sufficient to overcome the natural impediments to initiating litigation.186
The doctrine should, on balance, recognize the copyrightability of illegallycreated works of graffiti art. Given the current state of the copyright doctrine in
otherwise illegal works, it would be anomalous not to recognize graffiti. Works
that are obscene or fraudulent, or used for an illegal purpose are no less protected
181. Tushnet, supra note 102, at 531. Graffiti artists add the risk of criminal prosecution.
182. See supra notes 80–81.
183. Tushnet, supra note 102, at 537.
184. See id. at 536 n.77 and sources cited therein.
185. See Rosenblatt, supra note 72, at 330–34 (describing “IP forbearance” in certain realms of
creative production).
186. These impediments may not be particularly high, given that most contemporaneous copyright
disputes are solved through issuance of cease and desist letters or other informal means without
significant challenge to the copyright by the alleged infringer. See Lauren McBrayer, The DirecTV
Cases: Applying Anti-SLAPP Laws to Copyright Protection Cease-and-Desist Letters, 20 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 603, 605 (2005) (“[S]ending cease-and-desist letters can be an effective way to avoid
litigation[.]”); Marjorie Heins & Tricia Beckles, Will Fair Use Survive? Free Expression in the Age of
Copyright Control, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, 33–36 (2005) (assessing the speech-suppressing
effects of cease-and-desist letters); Gonzalez, supra note 3, at B1 (Rosenstein case settled and book
taken out of print without litigation).

54

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:1

by the copyright law than great works of art. Judges who have considered the issue
in detail have wisely concluded that importing other legal concerns in the threshold
consideration of copyrightability would create “theological, philosophical,
economic and scientific” difficulties that are “staggering to contemplate.”187
Moreover, if the question of copyrightability could turn not on a works content but
on the circumstances of its production, as would have to be the case if graffiti were
denied copyright protection, then courts would be required to make a detailed
factual inquiry into every work’s provenance to ensure that no illegality tainted any
step in its production. Such an inquiry would drastically unsettle copyright law and
provide copyright defendants ample opportunity to prolong the time and cost of
proceedings, increasing the difficulty of protecting copyrighted works through an
extrinsic inquiry into the circumstances of its production.188
Furthermore, recognition of copyright protection would protect the interests of
artists whose works were used without their permission in a way that was so
inimical to their interests or preferences that they would sue, even with the threat of
criminal sanction as an added obstacle to the usual high costs of litigation. To
motivate an artist to pursue his or her rights, the costs to inaction would have to be
unusually high, so it makes sense to have a remedy available to those whose
interests are so harmed by an infringing work they are willing to spend the time and
money to bring suit, as well as risk prosecution. The costs of the system would
ensure that it would be self-regulating and only the most unusual or severe cases
would actually come to court. The vast majority of infringement would remain
outside the copyright system. Copyright protection would, most likely, have
relatively little effect on the rate of production, which is driven almost entirely by
incentives and preferences that fall outside of the intellectual property scheme.189
The simple fact that in forty years of modern graffiti production there is only one
unreported case190 that deals with copyright in graffiti is a significant testament to
its ability to exist outside of the bounds of copyright law.
V. CONCLUSION
The story of graffiti is an interesting one for what it tells us about the limits of
the intellectual property laws. Graffiti represents cultural production on a massive
scale that operates almost entirely without regard to copyright law. Thus, it is one
among a growing number of counterpoints to the traditional notion that the
incentives created by copyright are the primary drivers of creative activity.191
While it may seem strange to conclude a paper on intellectual property by
concluding that intellectual property does not much matter, it is important to
187. Belcher v. Tarbox, 486 F.2d 1087, 1088 (9th Cir. 1973).
188. This is not to say that it may not be a good idea to limit copyright protection in meaningful
ways. If copyright protections should be limited, it would be best to do so directly through reforms of
the copyright law, not by allowing defendants to raise extrinsic arguments about the circumstances of a
work’s production.
189. See supra Section III.
190. Villa v. Pearson Educ., Inc., No. 03 C 3717, 2003 WL 23801408, (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2003).
191. For a discussion of other types of socially productive creation that track poorly onto traditional
legally-centered explanations of copyright, see generally Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect
Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799 (2000); Rosenblatt, supra note 72.
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recognize the boundaries of our theories of intellectual property protection, and the
well of creativity and creation that exists outside of the legal system.

